Overbought!!?

So, the market has been going crazy after the election and people keep talking about how 'overbought' the market is. Well, the market certainly has gone up a lot in a short time. But is this important or relevant?

Back in my technical days when I was doing a lot of research on technical indicators, the irony was that when a short term oscillator like the RSI or MACD was in 'overbought' region where most books tell you that the market is overbought and therefore must be sold, the markets tended to do even better.  Of course, over time, all of this nets out to a random result as buying overbought markets made you tons of money in trending markets and vice versa. The key was trying to figure out whether the market will be range-bound or trending in the future. Without knowing that, the indicators were basically useless.

But anyway, the overvaluation, rising interest rates and short-term overbought-ness of the market got me thinking about what really matters in calling major turns. People have been calling for a bear market since the crisis and they've been wrong. The stock market has been called a bubble too.  Maybe it's a bubble. In any case, people have been saying the market is overbought for a long time, even when the market just rallied back to where it was pre-crisis. Is something that goes from $100 to $50, and then back to $100 really overbought? Or is it just flat?

Predictions
And by the way, I just want to reiterate how useless predictions are. I remember on a Markel conference call Thomas Gaynor pointed out how oil prices went from $100 to $50 in just a few months, proving that "nobody knows anything" or some such.

This year has again really reinforced this idea. First it was Brexit, and then it was the U.S. election. People were wrong about Brexit (UK voted 'out') and then the markets rallied hard after an initial dip. The same thing happened with the U.S. election.

People say that the market is getting overly optimistic and is likely discounting more than Trump can actually deliver. This is probably true to some extent.

But my feeling is not so much that Trump is going to get the economy going strong; it's that the heavy cloud hanging over the economy and banks has sort of been lifted. Elizabeth Warren will probably have less influence, and the cabinet seems to be filling up with billionaires including Goldman Sachs people and Jamie Dimon too, to head the Business Roundtable.


Long-Term Overbought
Anyway, for long term investors, we don't care if the market is short-term overbought or oversold. We'll leave that to the daytraders. Short-term overbought means nothing, usually. It either means the market will take a break, correct, or will keep going up. Useful, right?

But seriously, if you want to look at overbought oscillators, there is one that is sort of interesting. There was a chart in Barron's last year that was interesting to me. It was in an interview with Joe Rosenberg, the chief investment strategist at Loews. He was calling for higher returns in U.S. stocks over the next 15 years. This was in contrast to most long term bearish views at the time (and even now).

Check it out.

I admit that when I saw this, I scratched my head a little. The chart looks like it should revert back to 10-12%, implying 10-12% trailing total returns over 15 years at some point in the future. That is not the sort of equity market return that I would expect over time. Of course, this may happen 15 years after the 2008/2009 low; this would give that 15-year return a little bump due to the low starting point.

But never mind that, the more important point for me was that despite what people were saying, that the market is overvalued, that the market is overbought (looking at the S&P return since the crisis low) and all that, I just wasn't feeling like the market was in a bubble ready to collapse.

I've seen some bubbles, and one of the key indicators in my mind of a real bubble is not only valuations, but trailing returns. When you see the Nikkei 225 in 1989, U.S. market in 1929 and 1999 and the recent gold bull market, they all had spectacular 1,3, 5 and 10 year (and maybe more time period) returns. This sort of high return pattern over many time spans reinforces the bull story and gets everybody participating.

To me, that sort of thing sets up the bubble; people chase returns, everybody jumps on board, that makes the market go up more, improving trailing returns in a self-reinforcing, virtuous circle of ever-rising stock prices.

This is not something that we see now. I haven't seen it at all in the rally since the crisis low either. It's been more of a grudging rally with doubts and deniers all along.

Updated Chart
So naturally, I updated the above chart to include the S&P 500 rally after the election through now (the Novemeber S&P figure is 2240).

If you notice the previous peaks, we are far away from that. We are in no way set up for a 1929 or 1999-type top in the stock market.

S&P 500 Index 15-year Annualized Change

(this is not total return like the above chart)

Of course, as usual, this doesn't mean that we can't go into a bear market. We can enter a bear market at any time for any reason. And the only people who are going to call it correctly are going to be the people who have been calling for one for years or decades (and those broken clocks will be right then).

Putting this together with my other post about interest rates, there doesn't seem to be a threat of an imminent, 1929/1999/Nikkei 1989-like top in the stock market. Sure, it can happen, but to me, the setup just isn't there.

Brooklyn Investor Website
Anyway, you can see this chart on an interactive basis (you can click to see values, even though I don't know why I can't see the latest datapoints; I am still experimenting with various charting libraries; this one uses Google Charts) at the new and still under-construction-so-not-so-interesting Brooklyn Investor website.

The chart is here: S&P 500 15-year Change

The website is here: http://brklninvestor.com/

Obviously, the more obvious, preferable domain names were already taken so I just took out the 'oo's from Brooklyn.

Anyway, I will be adding stuff there over time. Maybe charts and tables that I like to keep up to date and track and some 'notes' about certain topics that I might want over there instead of here where it can get buried under hundreds of other blog posts.

Keep in mind that it is sort of a coding experiment on my part too, so there will be problems that I will try to resolve over time. For example, the 13F tool stinks... I have to work on that. Probably not too hard, but just a matter of spending time to fix it.

Bonds Down, Stocks Up!

So bonds are 'crashing' and stocks are going up. Some say that this can't continue; you can't have stocks and bonds go in opposite directions for long before something snaps. Well, this is true to some extent.

But it sort of depends on which way the 'snap' is happening.  What if bonds were way overvalued versus stocks? In that case, bonds can tank a lot before stocks have to correct. Bears have been saying forever that once the bond market turns and interest rates start to go up, the stock market will crash.

Maybe so.

Let's take a step back and look at what's going on. How can bonds go down and stocks go up?

Here is a look at the earnings yield versus 10-year bond yields since 1871.  The data is from Shiller's website:

S&P 500 Earnings Yield versus 10-year Bond Yield
(1871-November 2016)

Earnings yield and bond yields have sort of tracked each other closely since the 1960's or so. Recently, bond yields went down a lot while earnings yield refused to follow it down. This spread is sort of a cushion for the stock market. Since the spread is so wide, it's not unnatural for both of them to go in opposite directions.

Here is a close-up of this chart from 1950. You can see that that bond yield and earnings yield do sort of track each other, and there is a cushion between them so rising bond yields at the moment do not pose an imminent threat to stock valuations.

S&P 500 Earnings Yield versus 10-year Bond Yield

(1950-November 2016)

Back in 1987 and 2000, for example, bond yields were higher than earnings yield. Back in 1987 before the crash, this spread blew out from 1.3% in December 1986 to 4.4% in September 1987.  That was the rubber-band stretch that caused the market to 'snap' (Black Monday) back into normalcy.

In January 2000, the gap also blew out to 3.3% from less than 1% after the Asian Contagion of 1997.

Here is the spread between bond yields and earnings yields since 1950:

Bond Yield - Earnings Yield

(1950-November 2016)

...and here's a close-up since 1980:

Bond Yield - Earnings Yield

(1980-November 2016)

You can see that pre-Black-Monday-spike in the spread in 1987. Just because the spread is wide doesn't mean a correction is coming, of course. The spread widened many times since 1980.

Nor does it mean that the market can't correct or crash when this is negative. In fact, the spread was negative before the financial crisis in 2007.  That spike you see in the spread chart above actually happened in 2009 when earnings plummeted.

But it is sort of a big-picture-rubber-band indicator. A correction in bonds doesn't automatically mean we must correct in stocks.  One way to look at it may be that if the spread widens too much above zero, it's a warning sign.  We are far from that at this point. 

P/E's Too High

And since I keep hearing, and have kept hearing for years and years that the stock market P/E is too high so therefore must crash or correct, I created this chart to show how meaningless the comment about P/E ratios are when looked at alone.

From the above, we can sort of see that earnings yields and bond yields track each other.  I know many people argue that this Fed model is no good. OK, so maybe it's no good, whatever that means. But you can't really separate the risk free interest rate from asset valuations. Whether you want to use 2.3% to discount long term assets or not is another issue. But over time, of course the treasury rate is going to be a huge factor in determining asset prices.

So, instead of looking at yields, I just drew the same charts as above but using a P/E ratio.  Instead of a bond yield, I created the bond P/E ratio (inverse of yield).

Check it out:

S&P 500 P/E versus 10-year Bond P/E

(1871-November 2016)

...and here's a close up:

S&P 500 P/E versus 10-year Bond P/E

(1950-November 2016)

So you see how bonds are way more overvalued than stocks.  Well, actually, I really don't know if bonds are overvalued or not. In order to know that, I would have to know what future inflation and economic growth is going to be, and I don't know that.

I am always baffled at comments like, "The market has averaged a P/E ratio of 14x for the last 100 years so the stock market is 40% overvalued at 20x...".

How can you compare 14x P/E to the current level without discussing interest rates?  And if you think stocks should trade at 14x P/E today, then you should also think that interest rates should be much higher than they are now. For example, the 10-year bond rate averaged 4.6% since 1871 and 5.8% since 1950. But these periods include a time when interest rates were not set by the market.

OK. So far, we have determined that the bond market rout up to now is no cause for concern for the stock market. Yields of 2.3% is still way below earnings yield.

So What Should 10-year Treasuries Yield?
Obviously, this is the next question. I am no economist so I actually have no idea, but one idea I have always liked is that someone said that long term interest rates should be equal to real GDP growth rate plus the inflation rate, or more simply, nominal GDP growth. This sort of makes sense.

So below is a chart of nominal GDP growth versus the 10-year bond yield. The data is from the FRED (St. Louis Fed) website.

Nominal GDP Growth versus 10-year Treasury Rate

(1930-2015)

Not so bad tracking. Here's a close-up from 1950:

Nominal GDP Growth versus 10-year Treasury Rate

(1950-2015)

So not bad.

From this chart, you can see that the bond market is in fact overvalued, even with a yield of more than 2%. Either that, or the market is expecting nominal GDP growth of only 2.3% or so as of now. As usual, we don't know who is right.

I read a quote of Jeffrey Gundlach of Doubleline saying that he thinks long term rates can get up to 6% in a few years. I don't know if he was referring to the 10-year or 30-year. But who looks at the 30-year anyway, right?

But for yields to get to 6%, Gundlach must be expecting much higher inflation. Real GDP is probably not going to grow that much more than 2%.  Maybe 3%.  But if it does grow 3%, we only need 3% inflation to get to a 6% bond yield.  OK. Maybe that's possible.

So should we be worried about 6% long term rates?

Here is a snip from my Scary Chart post from this summer. 

1955-2014:

            Interest rate range           average P/E

                   4 - 6%                             23.3x
                   6 - 8%                             19.6x 

I looked at the data from 1955-2014 (adding one more year to update this isn't going to change much) to see what the average P/E ratios were when interest rates were in certain ranges.

From the above, we see that the market traded at an average P/E of 23.3x when interest rates were between 4% and 6%.  The 10-year now is at 2.3%.  So we have a long, long way to go for interest rates to threaten the stock market, at least in terms of the bond-yield/earnings-yield model.

Even if rates got up to the 6-8% range, the average P/E has been 20x P/E, or where the stock market is now on a current year basis.

So even if interest rates popped up to 6-8%, the stock market has no need for a valuation adjustment.

Of course, the market can still react negatively to big moves in the bond market, and of course, higher interest rates will impact earnings of companies with debt. This may be offset by a stronger economy if that's what leads to higher rates, not to mention higher earnings at banks and other financials that have been suffering under this low rate environment. It's always tough to model this stuff out.

As we have seen recently with the election, nobody really knows what's going to happen. And even when things are predicted correctly, the market reaction tends to surprise.

From the above blog post, here is a regression analysis of bond yields versus earnings yields. The 1980-2007 period seems overfit for sure; it's a period when stock yields and bond yields tracked each other very closely. I think I used the excuse that post-2007, we have been living in a post-crisis environment of unnaturally low interest rates.

So you can reject that regression as not valid.

Here is the original post when I looked at the relationship between bond yields and earnings yields:
scatterplot.

Again, keep in mind that long term rates after the post-election 'plunge' is 2.3%. The above regression shows that even at 4%  bond yields, almost double the current level, the market tends to trade at anywhere from 19x to 31x P/E.

Conclusion
So bond prices have tanked and the stock market doesn't care at this point. Bears say this can't go on and that overvalued stocks will follow bonds down soon.

The above shows that

• The recent plunge in bonds is a rubber band snapping back (bonds way overvalued versus stocks) and not a rubber band stretching that will eventually snap (like the bond crash before Black Monday).
• Bond yields are still below earnings yields so current bond market correction shouldn't be a threat to stock prices at current or much higher levels. 
• Bond yields will probably have to get much higher than earnings yield before it becomes a serious threat to stock prices. 
• Even with bond yields at 6-8%, stocks prices can be reasonably valued at current levels. 
• Saying the stock market is overvalued with respect to historical averages is nonsense without reference to historic relationship to bond yields.
• etc...

Having said all that, of course the market can still tank for any number of reasons; geopolitical issues, economy tanking, some sort of crisis etc. 

This only isolates and looks at two factors. And according to those two factors, there is no tension that needs to be resolved. 

Since I tend to post these and other charts on occasion, and it's a hassle for me to update every time, I am going to set up a companion website to this blog that will have this data and charts that I can update and reference so I don't need to update and cut/paste into a blog post. Also, anyone can go there and look at it at any time to see what these indicators are saying. 

There will be other information/data posted there too as sort of my public, personal investment notebook.  

I will provide a link to it when it's ready. 

Active Play: Pzena Investment Management Inc. (PZN)

So, continuing with the theme of active investing, I decided to take a look at Pzena Investment Management again. I've been watching it for a while and have posted about it in the past, but the stars are lining up more now than before. I think the sentiment against active investing is at sort of a peak.

I don't usually like investing in themes, though. Those things never seem to work out. Health care stocks because of the aging population, investing in the baby-boom consumption boom, investing in green/environmental, investing in hard assets because they don't make land anymore (versus paper assets) etc. From what I've seen over the years, it just never seems to work out the way people think. Just sticking to great businesses at decent prices seems the way to go.

But sometimes, there are themes that look sort of interesting only because sentiment seems to be leaning too hard one way or the other, and there seems to be interesting investment ideas.

I don't like when things line up too much in terms of investment themes because that often means a lot of people also agree and it may not work out. But things got more in line this week with the surprise election of Trump.  Of course, everyone thought Clinton would win (but she didn't), and many thought that the market would crash if Trump was elected (but it rallied, even though the crash callers were sort of right for a few hours).

This has lead to a huge rally in the stock market with financials finally showing some real strength. Even the Berkshire Hathaway chart looks funny, like it was about to be LBO'ed or something.

Even Stanley Druckenmiller sold his gold and got into stocks on Trump's win. It's true that in terms of trend, DC will probably move away from over-regulation.  And banks probably won't have to worry about Sanders/Warren bank-destruction.

Many may not like Trump, but in the end, he has his ego on the line and he is a negotiator so I would not be surprised if he got a lot of things done. Many things people will not agree with, like rolling back environmental/green initiatives. But these can be very pro-business, pro-investment.

So when you see it that way, and see how the industrial cyclicals and banks rallied and the FANGs got killed, if this trend continues, it can really put a dent in the below value cycles charts because the value stocks were the ones that have been suffering in recent years due to this tendency to over-regulate.

Anyway, I usually wouldn't expect a lot of change from an election, but this time the Republicans control congress (Republicans don't really control Trump, though) so there can be a lot more change than usual.

Before we start on PZN, they updated their report on the value cycle so let's look at that. It's really interesting.

Pzena Update on the Value Cycle
Here's the link to their 3Q commentary. Go there and read it:

     Pzena 3Q commentary

What really interested me about this idea and why I am so intrigued by it is that for most of the time I've been writing this blog (starting in 2011), people have been saying that the market is way overvalued, that the market will crash, that it's a bubble etc.  Even in 2008/2009, people were saying that the sky-high P/E ratios were insane and the market will not recover (even though the high P/E's were due to great recession-depressed earnings).

And each time I read that stuff, I looked at the stocks I own, watch or whatever, and what I saw on my spreadsheets just didn't correspond to what people were saying about the market. I've posted about that over the years. I was always scratching my head.

And then I found these reports and I was like, of course!  The market is bifurcated. FANG stocks and many others were going through the roof and had super-high valuations, but many others were just priced normally.  Maybe not cheap, but not expensive either. And actually, many were cheap (especially financials).

Anyway, let's take a look at some of the updated charts.





Now that's an amazing chart. Do you want to be long that chart or short it? Some will argue that this looks just like the P/E chart. If you want to short this chart, why wouldn't you want to short the P/E chart too (short stocks). The big difference here is that this chart is a spread between stocks, so it is much more likely for this chart to mean revert than the other P/E chart (which may stay high for years due to lower interest rates; yes, rates are moving up now, but they would have to move up a lot to get P/E's to revert to 100-year average levels).

If you look carefully at this chart, you will see that the chart mean-reverted as recently as the mid-2000's (actually hitting the lower bound of it, unlike the P/E or CAPE charts).

So this chart is way more likely to mean-revert than raw P/E or CAPE charts. I would much rather short this chart than a raw P/E or CAPE chart.

And to play this, you obviously want to go long value stocks, or get into a long/short strategies based on valuation (see my previous post about the Gotham Funds or OZM).

Pzena shows the same charts/tables for European and Japanese stocks too and it is very interesting.  I won't paste those here, though, so go see for yourself.

Check out this table:

This sort of shows the various deep value cycles we've been through over the years. The current cycle hasn't been that great for value, but I see it as sort of an elongated cycle; elongated partly due to the great recession and it's after-effects.

Value Didn't Suddenly Become Useless
I don't think anything happened that suddenly makes value not work anymore. There is a lot of factors at work here, and interestingly, a lot of it may also have to do with the boom in passive investing and the bear market in active investing. People often argue that fundamental stock-picking doesn't work anymore due to indexing and the ETF-ing of the world. But as Buffett said in his 1985 letter, that should really be great for us value people.

But regulation and subdued economic cycle after the great recession made value stocks perform poorly making active funds not perform well, thus pushing investor capital out of active funds into passive funds thus exacerbating the prolonging of the value cycle etc. This is sort of the self-reinforcing cycle that lead to the extreme valuation dispersion you see in the chart above.

This is not a permanent state, though. We've seen this before.

Anyway, let's take a closer look at Pzena, their funds' performance and how this all ties into the above charts/tables and how it tells an interesting story about the possible future of PZN.

PZN Fund Performance
What's really great about PZN's disclosure is that they have performance figures in their 10-Ks and 10-Qs, with a benchmark. Alternative asset managers usually have this stuff too, making it easier to evaluate as potential investments.  Many conventional managers, though, don't show this stuff, so you really have no idea if their funds outperform or not.

I have always been interested in the Affiliated Managers Group (AMG), for example, but that's sort of been my problem. They own fund managers that I really respect, from Tweedy Browne to Yacktman, ValueAct etc., but you really can't tell how they are performing overall. Also, the managers I am familiar with are only a small part of their business. Plus they own a bunch of alternative managers; I would be even more curious about those and how they perform. On a cash earnings basis, AMG is cheap so it is interesting, but that's always been the hurdle for me that I couldn't get over.  I don't think they will have a Legg-Mason-(LM)-during-the-crisis type of problem, but that's the thing with alternative managers; if you don't really understand what they are doing, you don't know if there are any time bombs anywhere.

Anyway, let's look at PZN.  From the above value cycle charts, we sort of already know that value funds haven't done well in the recent past. You can see that the value spread since the mid-2000's has just continued to widen, meaning expensive stocks got more expensive versus cheap stocks. If you are a value investor, you would be rowing upstream.

The following table is from their 3Q2016 10-Q:

		Period Ended September 30, 20161
Investment Strategy (Inception Date)		Since Inception			5 Years			3 Years			1 Year
Large Cap Expanded Value (July 2012)
Annualized Gross Returns		14.5	%		N/A			9.1	%		14.6	%
Annualized Net Returns		14.3	%		N/A			8.9	%		14.4	%
Russell 1000® Value Index		13.6	%		N/A			9.7	%		16.2	%
Large Cap Focused Value (October 2000)
Annualized Gross Returns		6.7	%		16.2	%		8.7	%		15.3	%
Annualized Net Returns		6.3	%		15.7	%		8.2	%		14.9	%
Russell 1000® Value Index		6.3	%		16.2	%		9.7	%		16.2	%
Global Focused Value (January 2004)
Annualized Gross Returns		4.8	%		12.8	%		3.5	%		8.9	%

Annualized Net Returns		4.0	%		12.1	%		2.9	%		8.2	%
MSCI® All Country World Index—Net/U.S.$2		6.2	%		10.6	%		5.2	%		12.0	%
International (ex-U.S) Expanded Value (November 2008)
Annualized Gross Returns		10.3	%		9.7	%		0.5	%		5.9	%
Annualized Net Returns		10.0	%		9.4	%		0.2	%		5.5	%
MSCI® EAFE Index—Net/U.S.$2		7.2	%		7.4	%		0.5	%		6.5	%
Focused Value (January 1996)
Annualized Gross Returns		10.6	%		17.2	%		9.1	%		16.1	%
Annualized Net Returns		9.8	%		16.5	%		8.5	%		15.5	%
Russell 1000® Value Index		8.7	%		16.2	%		9.7	%		16.2	%
Emerging Markets Focused Value (January 2008)
Annualized Gross Returns		1.2	%		5.3	%		(1.7	)%		19.8	%
Annualized Net Returns		0.3	%		4.6	%		(2.4	)%		18.9	%
MSCI® Emerging Markets Index—Net/U.S.$2		(1.2	)%		3.0	%		(0.6	)%		16.8	%
Global Expanded Value (January 2010)
Annualized Gross Returns		7.8	%		12.4	%		4.4	%		9.6	%
Annualized Net Returns		7.5	%		12.1	%		4.0	%		9.2	%
MSCI® World Index—Net/U.S.$2		8.2	%		11.6	%		5.8	%		11.4	%
Mid Cap Expanded Value (April 2014)
Annualized Gross Returns		6.3	%		N/A			N/A			18.1	%
Annualized Net Returns		6.1	%		N/A			N/A			17.8	%
Russell Mid Cap® Value Index		6.9	%		N/A			N/A			17.3	%
Small Cap Focused Value (January 1996)
Annualized Gross Returns		13.9	%		20.1	%		10.7	%		18.5	%
Annualized Net Returns		12.6	%		18.9	%		9.6	%		17.3	%
Russell 2000® Value Index		9.7	%		15.5	%		6.8	%		18.8	%
European Focused Value (August 2008)
Annualized Gross Returns		4.0	%		10.2	%		(1.6	)%		1.9	%
Annualized Net Returns		3.6	%		9.8	%		(2.0	)%		1.5	%
MSCI® Europe Index—Net/U.S.$2		0.9	%		7.5	%		(0.6	)%		2.5	%
International (ex-U.S) Focused Value (January 2004)
Annualized Gross Returns		5.7	%		10.2	%		0.3	%		6.7	%
Annualized Net Returns		4.9	%		9.5	%		(0.3	)%		6.1	%
MSCI® All Country World ex-U.S. Index—Net/U.S.$2		5.5	%		6.0	%		0.2	%		9.3	%
Mid Cap Focused Value (September 1998)
Annualized Gross Returns		12.8	%		20.0	%		9.4	%		18.3	%
Annualized Net Returns		12.0	%		19.2	%		8.7	%		17.6	%
Russell Mid Cap® Value Index		10.4	%		17.4	%		10.5	%		17.3	%

Some of the long term performance is pretty good, but otherwise a mixed bag, but then again, against the backdrop of a 'bad for value' environment for most of the recent past, it may not be so bad. OK, maybe I am being too forgiving. But that's just my view. It has just been a terrible time to be a value investor.  The value opportunity chart went from -1 standard deviation to +3 standard deviations. That's a really strong headwind.

Older Record of PZN
OK, so I decided to look further back.  How did PZN do when there wasn't such a headwind? From their prospectus in 2007, I found this chart. It's the performance of their value strategy from 1995 to 2007.

Look:

That's really impressive.  Great outperformance.

And then go back to the value opportunity chart above. There really was no massive wind at their back in terms of value opportunity. It wasn't like the period 1995-2007 was one where it went from "significant value opportunity" to "limited value opportunity". It looks like, just eyeballing, it went from a period of "limited value opportunity" to "limited value opportunity", but maybe slightly less so.  So there wasn't that sort of wind at their back.

But look closer at the above chart.  From 1995 to around 2000 or so, PZN was underperforming. And again, go back to the above value opportunity chart, and sure enough, that period of underperformance corresponds to a period when the market went from "limited value opportunity" to "significant value opportunity" in 2000. Bingo!

So this current cycle of underperformance may be a little elongated, but if 1995-2000 is any guide, PZN may have some serious outperformance in store when things mean revert.

And if the period of underperformance is elongated, the period of outperformance may be elongated too.  Who knows?

Here's a marked version of the above charts close to each other so you can see it better:

The red arrows show periods bad for value investing and blue arrows show good times for value. We may get a nice extended blue arrow in the next few years. If that happens, that would be great for value funds.

PZN Fundamentals
So what is PZN worth? I don't know. I have no idea. In order to figure that out, you have to know what AUM will be in the future, and I have no idea about that.

But I think if you can make the case that PZN is reasonably valued at current levels of AUM and profitability, then it's a good deal because you are expecting the mean reversion of the above value spread chart and therefore outperformance, maybe even significant and long term outperformance over the next few years. Operating leverage of asset managers here might kick in too as PZN seems to run their funds as a small team (alternative asset managers seem to add AUM by adding teams which doesn't give it the same operating leverage as the cost base goes up).

So that's all I hope to achieve. Let's just see if it's reasonably priced with conservative, reasonable, close-to-status-quo assumptions.

Here are some key data of PZN:

					Year-
		Oper	Oper	DVD/	end
	Revenues	income	mgn	share	AUM
	($mn)	($mn)			($bn)
2002	32,817	15,828	48.23%		3.1
2003	33,584	14,413	42.92%		5.8
2004	51,896	18,050	34.78%		10.7
2005	78,596	31,577	40.18%		16.8
2006	115,087	33,609	29.20%		27.3
2007	147,149	69,378	47.15%	$0.11	23.6
2008	101,404	64,393	63.50%	$0.27	10.7
2009	63,039	29,787	47.25%	$0.00	14.3
2010	77,525	39,970	51.56%	$0.24	15.6
2011	83,045	37,854	45.58%	$0.12	13.5
2012	76,280	37,179	48.74%	$0.28	17.1
2013	95,769	50,848	53.09%	$0.25	25.0
2014	112,511	60,953	54.18%	$0.35	27.7
2015	116,607	55,417	47.52%	$0.41	26.0

You can see that PZN has had a rough history, but mostly due to the financial crisis. If you think something like that is coming soon, then of course, don't bother with this stock.  Just wait for the crisis to happen and buy it then.

Otherwise, here are some simple assumptions I made to model their earnings.

First, their AUM at the end of October 2016 was $27.2 billion. But since the post-Trump rally was good for financials and value stocks in general, and maybe some people will buy PZN funds after reading this post, let's use $30 billion in AUM.  It's not stretch at all from the pre-Trump AUM of $27 billion.

Their average management fee rate was around 0.43% in 2014 and 2015, 0.48% in the past five years, and 0.51% since 2007 (actually this is just revenues divided by average AUM).  These figures include incentive fees too, but their inventive fees are nothing like hedge fund/private equity incentive fees so are very small in proportion to management fees.

But still, due to fee pressures across the industry, let's just use 0.4% as the average fee rate.

Also, operating margin has averaged around 50%-51% in the last five years and since 2007.  So let's use 50% as the operating margin. Pretax margin has also averaged around 50% since 2002.

OK, and there are around 69 million fully diluted shares outstanding, so let's use that to get operating EPS, or as a proxy for pretax earnings (remember, we like to price things at 10x pretax earnings).

Using the above assumptions, we get to $0.87/share in operating earnings.  There are non-operating items below the operating income line, but I ignored that because that is mostly due to investment gain/losses (which I can't predict and would imagine it wouldn't average out to much over time), and adjustments in tax related things (due to exchanges of units into class A shares etc.) which are non-operational.

10x this $0.87/share figure is around $8.70/share, not far from where it is trading now.

Non-GAAP EPS in 2014 and 2015 were $0.51/share and PZN likes to pay 70%-80% of non-GAAP earnings out as dividends.  So that would be around $0.40/share, which is pretty much what they paid out in 2015.  And 2015 wasn't even a great year by any means (funds were down).

Anyway, $0.40/share on a $8.90 stock price is a 4.5% dividend yield. PZN is trading at 17.4x the $0.51 2015 EPS, so it is not a screaming bargain, but not terribly expensive either. Asset managers are cheap now, but they used to typically trade at 20x P/E or so.

Operating Leverage
Asset managers are great businesses because if you have a team in place, any increase in AUM due to investment inflows and increase in portfolio value leads to increases in fee income which fall straight to the bottom line (net of some bonuses).

The problem with some of the alternative managers is that sometimes they grow assets by adding new strategies; this requires increasing overhead.  Of course, over time, if the new teams can increase AUM, that would be great for earnings.

PZN seems to add strategies more organically.  Their expenses have been creeping up lately, but that may just be due to returning expenses to where they were before considerable belt-tightening during and after the financial crisis and there have been additions in sales (increase distribution, mutual funds, London office etc). 2015 operating expenses were higher at $61 million than the $50 million or so back in 2007. First nine months of 2016 is running a little lower than 2015. There were $1.8 million non-recurring expense, though, in 2015.

Conclusion
So even here, PZN is reasonable priced.  Not really cheap or anything as is, but the company is positioned well for any recovery in active value investing.

I do believe things are cyclical, especially on Wall Street, and value investing has been in a bear market for a long time. If that rubber band in the above chart snaps back, PZN could be one of the huge winners. They made money through the crisis so PZN is not going to blow up either.