Showing posts with label LMCA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label LMCA. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 15, 2013

Liberty Media Investor Day 2013

So Liberty Media (LMCA) had their investor day last week.  I wasn't there but the investor day webcast is available with a slide presentation at the LMCA website.   

There was some fun stuff in the beginning (with a disturbing slide of Greg Maffei doing some sort of dance) and then Maffei (LMCA), Meyer (Sirius XM), Rutledge (Charter) and Rapino (Live Nation) did presentations on their businesses.

Anyway, I will cut and paste a whole bunch of stuff from the presentation as it's easier to do that than to type stuff up myself.

This will be sort of a summary, but not a complete summary.  This is sort of a note to myself so I will add thoughts along the way.  Maybe it will be helpful for people who don't want to sit down for two hours to listen to the webcast. 

Those interested in LMCA should at least go look at the slides (much of them are here, but many more in the original presentation) and if you have time, listen to the presentations.  They are really well done, and the Q&A afterwards is very interesting. 

John Malone is one of the legendary people in business and he is always worth listening to.  You can learn a lot about many things by listening to him.  Just like you learn a lot about banking by listening to Jamie Dimon and learn a lot about everything from listening to Buffett, you learn a lot about cable, media / entertainment from listening to Malone.

Anyway, here is one of the 'fun' section slides from the presentation:


Non-New Yorkers might not recognize the buildings in this photo, but that's the Time Warner Center in New York City.  Maffei was talking about a fictional radio station on Sirius XM (called Malone's Melodies).  The tune playing is "Time Is On My Side", so you know they really want to do this deal.

News


LMCA did a series of deals to raise some cash (that was used to pay down margin debt).  LMCA continues to repurchase shares.  As we'll see later, they have already bought back more than half the shares in the recent past.  The repurchase of 5.2% of LMCA from Comcast in a tax-free exchange was priced at $132/share.  LMCA still has $327 million in repurchase authorization after this deal (details of this deal are in the presentation slides).
The sale of SIRI shares back to SIRI also comes tax efficiently as this was some of the high basis stock that LMCA owns and effectively gets dividend treatment for tax purposes.   

The convertible bond deal is a tax efficient way to lock in some low funding rates for the long term (10 years).



As a result, LMCA has been able to pay down much of the margin debt they took on when they bought Charter.  Maffei used the term "reload the gun" to describe what these transactions did.  Those words should excite people who are looking for LMCA to do more deals.   Well, maybe they are getting ready for Time Warner Cable.


LMCA is very shareholder friendly (we already knew that), but this chart is incredible.  They've bought back more than half of their shares since 2008, and they still have plenty of liquidity (borrowing capacity, high basis SIRI shares etc...).

Stock Price Performance


LMCA share price performance has been amazing too, and recent performance is not just a recovery from the crisis lows.  The CAGR is +36%/year since 2006, so that includes the crisis.



Sirius XM (SIRI)
Jim Meyer made a presentation about SIRI which I thought was very interesting.  He addresses some of the questions that critics raise.

Of course, LMCA bought SIRI as a distressed situation and did very well with it, but Malone sees a lot more growth ahead for SIRI.


One of the issues is competition from internet radio, like Pandora and music services like Spotify.  Meyer points out that SIRI is not a music company.  SIRI does music, talk and sports:


Also, with respect to competition from internet streaming services, Meyer points out that the big competitor out there is still terrestrial radio:


The following charts show the superior earnings model versus the competition:




Growth
The following charts show subscriber, revenue and EBITDA growth:





Increasing Margins

Meyer said that SIRI can safely get to 40%+ EBITDA margins at maturity.  He said this is doable due to the scalability of the business.


But at the end of the day, what's really important is free cash:


and free cash per share:


He said he is asked what he values more; subscriber growth, revenue or EBITDA?  He said "yes" to all but free cash flow per share growth is most important.

Growth is linked to new auto sales, obviously, and here's the trend and forecast (auto industry forecast).  SIRI has been increasing share in new auto sales. 


What's interesting is that even if new auto sales flatten out, SIRI can still grow subscribers because every new auto sale is a potential new subscriber (assuming the new car buyer didn't have it before; otherwise I suppose a driver just replaces a car so subscriber count won't change).

Anyway, SIRI did some work on this and shows the growth potential based on projected new car sales:


Meyer said that they are very comfortable that they will reach more than 100 million enabled vehicles by 2018 (enabled vehicles is not the same as number of subscribers, but shows the potential).

Their balance sheet looks much better now than before at 2.7x leverage (versus 3.5x target):



The other big growth area is used cars.  The used car market is 3x larger than the new car market and this area has a lot of potential.  Also, connected vehicle services (telematics) is another area of growth potential that Meyer talked about. 

As Malone mentioned in the Q&A later, he sees a lot more growth to come at SIRI.

Charter Communications (CHTR) 
Tom Rutledge did a presentation on CHTR.  This is actually a pretty exciting situation, I think.  There is a lot more on the topic in the Q&A where Malone talks a lot about the history of cable and what he sees happening there going forward.

One of the reasons why I got interested in CHTR and LMCA (I have owned LMCA and DISCA in the past but haven't followed them too much recently until early this year) again is because I thought that the industry was coming to some big inflection point.  For many years, cable companies just kept growing by adding subscribers.  They were making so much money and growing so much that they didn't really care what they paid for content as the subscribers paid for them.  That's why I was always a fan of content; I've owned Disney and CBS in the past for that reason.  I figured content providers will always get paid regardless of what happens in the distribution world.  For all I care, the phone, cable and satellite companies can fight it out and destroy each other, but they will all still have to pay high fees to ESPN.  So as a Disney shareholder, I was indifferent to what happened in the pipe wars.  Who cares who won.  They will all just have to pay more to get more content to compete even more.

Then cable got saturated (well, it has been saturated for a while) and stopped growing and then phone companies came in with video offerings, and of course satellite companies continued to take share away from cable.  So, all of a sudden, with distributors unable to grow (due to saturation), and prices of content continuing to go up and customer cable bills rising, new alternatives pop up, like Netflix, Hulu, Youtube or whatever else.

Distribution companies start wondering why they are paying so much money to content providers when the same content can sometimes be viewed elsewhere for free.

In any case, I don't really understand the media business that much, but all of this stuff was the impression I was getting.  The industry seemed really ripe for a change.  Business as usual just wasn't going to work anymore.

And then LMCA takes a big stake in CHTR.  So for me, this deal coincided with my feeling that something is happening in the industry, or at least something is about to happen.  At first, I wasn't sure how the industry can change.  I thought, like everybody else, that cable was under pressure from phone companies and satellite providers, and increasingly from over-the-top TV.  I did understand that their ownership of the last mile into people's homes was a big asset but it wasn't really clear to me how the cable companies with their video package (which Malone himself said will be obsolete in five years or less) will compete with the over-the-top guys like Netflix.

Now I think I understand this a lot better what can happen.

Anyway, let's get back to the CHTR presentation where Rutledge explains why CHTR is such a great opportunity.

CHTR History
Rutledge started by explaining the history of CHTR.  It was founded by Paul Allen.  They assembled a big system by paying very high prices and spent a lot of money creating a state-of-the-art network.  Because of the high prices they paid and poor management, they went bankrupt.  They then had to cut cost where they shouldn't have leading to poor service etc.  As a result of this, CHTR has the lowest product penetration.

So a lot of the growth story here is just bringing things back up to where they should be in terms of product penetration.  Here is a slide that shows the potential for CHTR:



Also, FiOS competes in only 4% of CHTR's markets.  As for satellite competition, CHTR's edge is that they have two-way connectivity versus one-way for satellite.

Malone said a while ago in an interview that he thinks CHTR can get competitive high speed internet at a much lower cost than others (fiber optics etc.).  Here is a slide that shows how this can happen:


This is the other story for CHTR.  By going all digital, they free up a lot of broadband on their cables that will allow them to increase speed / capacity for high speed internet and other things.

Rutledge says that capex is high now due to spending related to going all digital, but once that is done capital intensity of the business should go down.  Along with increasing revenues, this should boost EBITDA going forward.

There are a lot more details in the presentation, but the CHTR story is pretty simple; reversing the years of undermanagement to boost revenues, going all digital, decreasing capex needs going forward and operating leverage from that.

Live Nation (LYV)
Frankly, Live Nation has never been on my radar.   I always thought of the concert industry has one that makes money from the occasional Rolling Stones fairwell tours, Kiss reunion tours and things like that.  I think for many years (not that I follow this stuff) the highest grossing concert tours tended to be these old, boomer-generation rock bands.  So Michael Rapino's presentation was an eye-opener for me.

Growth
First of all, I was wrong about the concert industry.  Who knew it was a growth business?  I don't go to concerts anymore, so I guess there would have been no way for me to know anyway.  But here it is:


And look at 2013 growth by region:


...and for ignorant people like me who think only U2 or the Stones can sell tickets, check this out:


I don't know if I should be proud or embarrassed to say that I have no idea who these people are.  OK, I know Fleetwood Mac, Depeche Mode, Kid Rock and Beyonce.  Not bad, I guess...

So why is it growing so much?  What's different now than before?  This is an interesting thing that Rapino said.  He explained that concerts these days are driven by fan demand.  In the past, concerts have been driven largely by record labels. It was the record distribution model that included concerts as promotional events to sell records. 

Now concert demand is driven by fans, and how this is done is very interesting:  It is done through social media like Youtube, Facebook etc.

Check out this slide:


So we see that only 17% of the Rihanna concerts take place in the world excluding North America and Western Europe, but 56% of her fans on Facebook and 40% on Youtube are from this area. 

If you ever wonder who benefits or makes money from Youtube or Facebook, well, now we can think about LYV.

The live concert business is not a particularly high margin business.  So that may be another reason why I wasn't too interested in LYV before, but the LYV business model is actually to use the live concert business to drive the other high margin businesses:


They are also increasing business through mobile (another question people keep asking; how people make money off of mobile), and their secondary ticket sales business looks pretty interesting.  There is a bunch of stuff in the presentation that you should look at if you're interested.

But the bottom line is that all of this is leading to some interesting growth:




 


Anyway, I've never looked at LYV in detail so I don't know where all the above numbers lead in terms of valuation, but there seems to be no doubt that it is growing at a decent rate and there seems to be some more growth opportunities in the future.

So that's it on the business presentations. 

And then there was what many may consider the most interesting part of the day.

Q&A Session
Malone and Maffei took questions from investors and there were some interesting discussions on various topics.  Anyway, these are from my messy notes so not word-for-word or anything.

Why continue to keep owning SIRI? Why not spin it off?
They like SIRI.  LMCA has no big free cash generating assets.  SIRI is the only big one.  It's ability to generate capital for LMCA to use is interesting.

SIRI is also a work in progress.  They feel they can still help SIRI. 

Maffei mentioned that historically, LMCA has spun off assets when the value of an asset was not recognized by the market, or when a business has reached an apogee.  They think neither is the case at SIRI.  The value of SIRI is well recognized inside of LMCA now and there is much more they can do there.  There is still "a lot of upside".

Malone says CHTR will require capital (Time Warner?).  SIRI will give them the financial flexibility to "chase a few more rabbits".

Malone also said that there are still some synergies in the music business that hasn't been exploited (and LMCA can help SIRI with that).

Is there more tension between programmers and distributors now?  Relationship more complex, more aggression than in the past?  Is this a reason for consolidating?
Malone said that programmers and distributors have had good relations for years.  It was all about who could create economic value.   The over-the-top phenomena is creating unusual tension.  TV everywhere would create value for everyone.   Distributors and content providers still have huge monetization systems to defend.  They will eventually realize that.  Consolidation will make it easier.  Fewer rational players works better than more, but is is not the primary reason to consolidate.

Dilution at CHTR in case of Time Warner deal
LMCA would like to keep interest above 25% for future flexibility.  LMCA would purchase more CHTR to keep interest above that level to offset dilution, for governmental reasons.  He explained later that the Investment Company Act makes a 25%-owned asset a good asset, and one under 25% a bad asset.  I think he meant that under 25%, the ICA would deem it a passive investor interest or an investment security so would make LMCA an investment company, whereas owning more than 25% would make it an operating subsidiary (so wouldn't make LMCA an investment company).

Competition to Cable
Malone feels that the long term competitive position of cable is good.  Increasing digitization of video will free up bandwidth,and increase speed and capacity of internet delivery.  Cable has a marginal cost advantage (a tremendous advantage) for base network.

He mentioned that DT (Deutsch Telecom) put in a volume cap.  DT provided content is not included in the volume cap but non-DT content is.  The regulators are currently digesting this so don't know what will happen.

Malone mentioned that eventually terrestrial carriers will have to price traffic based on volume.  The current model is unsustainable as revenue and pricing won't reflect capital pressures of the providers.

Over-the-top content can be bundled with broadband and when that starts to happen, cable can clawback share from satellite.  Cable market share will grow because of services bundled.  (Somewhere he said that cable will get at or equal to fiberoptics in terms of speed).

Intrinsic Value versus Price of the Parts
Someone asked him how he viewed the prices of LMCA holdings versus intrinsic value.

Malone said that he has always been a leveraged free cash flow investor, so he discounts the free cash flow at whatever interest rate they can fund at.  If you lengthen the maturity and fund at current levels, he says that the "multiples look low to me".

Importance of Content?  Does CHTR need more content?  Comcast bought NBC
Malone said that the control of content is an important determinant of market share.  He then went on to explain the evolution of the cable business.

Cable in the early days was highly balkanized.  There was no ubiquity and they didn't compete with each other.  Back then, the opportunity for cooperation, scale and uqiquity was obvious.

TCI did one acquisition a week for ten years.

As an industry, they got together to cooperate.  They organized joint ventures.  For example, in technology they created the MPEG video compression, coaxial cable architecture etc...  In content, they created Discovery, BET, Telemundo etc...  The industry created 23 or 24 programming vehicles that the cable industry collectively invested in.

Ted Turner was an entrepreneur that got the support of the industry.  TCI was a founding investor in Fox News.

The industry solved the balkanization and scale problem by joint effort.  Malone says it can be done again.  Hulu can be syndicated, or something created from scratch.

He mentioned Comcast, as big as it is, can't buy national level content.  It's not big enough. You have to be pretty big to get content for TV everywhere.

So this cable industry inability to buy or create content has benefitted Netflix. They buy nationally, distribute ubiquitously and their local distribution is incrementally free.  This is not a situation that can persist indefinitely.

Cable industry is in the need of organizational development.

HBO transformed the cable industry and "made us all rich".  If there is an equivalent to that, of course they would be more enthusiastic in investing in the business.  M&A and industry cooperation go hand-in-hand. 

(At some point the Microsoft purchase of Comcast shares was mentioned, and Maffei was actually at Microsoft at the time and did the deal; so we know he knows the business)

Investment opportunities?  Which Liberty entity is the cheapest?
Malone said international (non-U.S.) is where the opportunity is now.  He said don't put all your eggs in the U.S. basket.  There are some rabbits outside of the U.S., but obviously he can't say what looks good.

Mobility?
75% of mobility is is wifi (and rising). The implication is that mobile traffic will end up on cable (wifi -> cable connection) and not cellular network.

With over-the-top and TV everywhere why do consumers need aggregation interface and pay economic rent?
Netflix, Hulu and other streaming models offer content without economic rent.
Malone said that the answer to that is that they don't need it.
Why did HBO come into existence?  Why didn't Hollywood sell directly to cable operators?  They couldn't work together.  This created opportunity for HBO to get scale.  Once they had scale, they didn't need all the studios so changed pricing power.

Over the top guys will get content through scale; original and unique content.  Netflix has enough scale to get exclusion and original content.

Netflix
Netflix started as a library of old content.  They built a business on low distribution cost (almost free); heavily subsidized U.S. Postal Service.  Netflix migrated to streaming service.  They have gained scale and ubiquity of presence.   The cable industry has been very slow and that gave a window of opportunity to the over-the-top guys.

With network neutrality (free incremental distribution cost) and scale, they have "quite a good business".

A year ago NFLX was written off by many, but it's good that NFLX survived.  If it was bought by someone with deep pockets it would've been more dangerous;  someone with infinite capacity to underwrite their strategy of buying exclusive content.

NFLX has scale and uniqueness to do well now   (but as he said before, this is not sustainable).

So that's about it.

My Thoughts
I do like LMCA and CHTR; I find them very interesting situations (SIRI and LYV don't look too bad either).  As far as valuation is concerned, it seems like most of LMCA value is driven by the large listed holdings.  The multiples look high, particularly on the big SIRI position, but the growth rates are pretty high too.   If they keep growing subscribers and their margins get up to over 40% (EBITDA margins) as they say, it can be pretty interesting.

On the other hand, for an entity like LMCA at this point in time, I tend to think the bigger question is what LMCA does with the liquidity offered by SIRI over time.

I would tend not to look at it like, "what is SIRI actually worth and how much per LMCA share is that?".  My question would be more like, as LMCA liquidates SIRI over time (via SIRI buybacks and maybe other transactions), what do they invest in next?

LMCA is obviously holding SIRI for the cash generation ability so more interesting to me is what they invest in with the cash from SIRI rather than what SIRI is worth.

This is not to say that it doesn't matter what SIRI is worth.   Malone said that SIRI gives them the flexibility to "chase a few more rabbits".  I'm sort of more interested in the "rabbits" than satellite radio.

Still, it's good to know that Malone thinks there is still a lot of upside there even as they use SIRI as a source of liquidity. 

Friday, May 24, 2013

Charter Communications (CHTR)

During the financial crisis I did pretty well.  I bought up some financials and other things and did pretty well coming out (having done well going into it too), but one of my biggest misses was Liberty Media.  I have no excuse for missing that as I did own it in the past and did very well with it and so was very familiar with John Malone and his various assets.  I sold out when I thought media assets were overpriced with deals being done at 15, 20, 30x EV/EBITDA (or something like that).

But during the crisis I was so focused on the financials and was so convinced that the biggest gainers coming out would be the financials that survive (and the financials seemed to be the scariest sector to even look at, which I liked) so it didn't even occur to me to look at Liberty.  I did buy CBS and other stocks in other sectors and did very well with them too, so I guess it's not so much that I was only looking at financials.  I don't know why, I just totally missed it.   I think the Yacktman fund nailed this one.

Here is a description of Liberty Media's stock price performance from the LMC 2012 annual report (it's interesting to note that Berkshire Hathaway recently took a stake in Liberty Media.  Weschler (One of BRK's new fund managers) has owned it in the past in his own fund, I think)):

 
So if you invested in Liberty back in May 2006, you would have earned 33%/year through March 2013.  That's an astounding rate of return no matter how you look at it.   And this stock was down a ton during the crisis and I didn't buy it, knowing that it was run by one of the greatest operators of all time! That's pretty shameful.
 
To rub it in, let's look at a chart. This chart is from the Liberty 2012 10K:
 

 
 
...and this is the actual chart of Liberty Media (which spun off LMC and changed into Starz):
 


If you bought some stock back in early 2009, you would have had a 25-fold gain.  Makes buying Bank of America look stupid in comparison; even the LEAPs.
 
If you even put just 10% into Liberty and 90% was held in cash (or investments that did nothing), you would have gained 36%/year since then.
 
Sure, there's no point in shoulda, woulda, coulda's.  There are tons of those.  We can't ever always get everything.  I know.  But this one was sitting right under my nose.  I've owned it before, I've owned Discovery Communications, I've always been a fan of content and never had any doubt that content would have value (and would increase value over time as more and more people would need it), knew who John Malone was etc.  There is no excuse for that.
 
Anyway, this would have been a career making investment (and surely it was for some; it's just that we don't hear all the stories!); kind of like Ted Weschler's W.R. Grace trade (or maybe Weschler bought a bunch in 2009!).
 
Next time you sit around and people are talking about finding the next subprime trade (black swan), next great bubble to short or people whining that markets are too efficient now to make the old Buffett partnership or Greenblatt-type returns, go back and look at this chart and say to yourself, "where was I and what was I doing?!"
 
OK, enough of that.
 
I may come back and take a look at Liberty and some of the other pieces of the Malone Media Complex later on.
 
Charter Communications (CHTR) / Malone Inteview on CNBC
But for now, what I actually wanted to do was to just post a summary of Malone's interview on CNBC not too long ago.  It was an extended interview and it was fascinating for many reasons.  It's not often that we get to hear a great investor talk about what he did and why he did it.  In this case, David Faber of CNBC asked Malone why he invested so much in Charter Communications (CHTR). 
 
We all know Malone built his wealth in the cable industry so it's not surprising that he is going back to it.  But it is sort of surprising in that for a long time, I have looked at the content providers as where the value was in the business and the pipe-owners as not so valuable (as competition keeps increasing).
 
Anyway, here are some notes from that interview.
  • Malone feels that 7-8x post-synergy EV/EBITDA multiple is very cheap if you can borrow at 3%.  Given super-cheap capital, sustainable cash flow businesses look very attractive to be bought on leverage.
  • You can't leverage a manufacturing company.  Maybe you can do 2x (debt / EBITDA).  But cable companies can go up to 5x leverage.  CHTR will operate at 5x leverage. Malone says that's where his other companies are, Discovery, QVC etc...
  • Malone believes that 80% of subscribers will reject sports programming at wholesale prices.  If that is the case, the current bundling of cable channels is an unsustainable model.  Cable is getting too expensive for too many households.  He thinks the old model will be gone in five years.
 
And specifically on CHTR:
  • CHTR has great management.  Rutledge, by all accounts, is the best operator/manager in the business.
  • Has been an undermanaged, underinvested asset for a number of years (implies potential for improvement).
  • Has been a victim of a lot of market share stealing by the satellite guys.
  • Faces the weakest competition terrestially.  Majority of systems not in Verizon or ATT universe/areas.
  • We are at a point in history where high speed connectivity is important.  There is a big appetite for speed.   Cable technology is the most cost-effective way to increase speed.  Cable will go to gigabyte-type connectivity speed in a couple of years.
  • Key is doing it cost-effectively at scale.  Malone says FIOS didn't work (losing money).  Overbuilding just broadband won't work.
  • Malone is personally convinced that cable can get to gigabyte speed with very little incremental capital.
 
The other way to look at CHTR (as Malone put it):
  • Great management team
  • Very large tax position
  • Unique position to be consolidator in the space
  • debt is very cheap
  • credibility of cash flow stream in cable has been growing so leverage is available

On TCI sale to ATT:
  • Malone didn't want to sell; it broke his heart to sell.
  • When someone offers a 40% premium you can't turn it down; responsibility to shareholders.
  • In retrospect, he wishes he hadn't done it.

Back to CHTR:
  • Unique opportunity to take a vehicle and grow it.
  • Through both superior marketing and promotion, internal/organic growth can be exceptionally strong for a number of years.
  • Particularly, the rate of growth of free cash flow can be very, very strong.
  • Allows it to access leverage market in order to do rollups/transactions, particularly when there are horizontal synergies.  Kind of like the old TCI model.
  • Horizontal acquisitions, synergies, growth scale, opportunities to work with other cable companies to form consortia (like the old "cable mafia" as Faber said).
  • Malone said he wants to bring back the old days of @Home, Ted Turner etc.  Back then they were able to create national scale.  Now he thinks they can create global scale.

Interesting Situation
So this is an interesting situation.  Malone just bought in and is just beginning to do something here.  Tom Rutledge just joined a little over a year ago.  This is also a post-bankruptcy play as one of the stocks we talk about here (Oaktree) sold a big stake in CHTR to Malone.  I suppose it's not so much a post-bankruptcy play anymore since it's up 3x or so since reemergence.

But the fact that it is reemergent, the stock seemed to be hated and despised (due to the leverage, view that old cable is dead etc...), they got a new CEO that is "by all accounts the best operator/manager in the business" and then the greatest investor/operator in the business just bought a giant stake (and wants to do something with it), and it has big tax loss carryforwards makes it pretty interesting.

Of course, this is also risky in that it is very leveraged.  A lot of people think interest rates are going to go a lot higher and that leveraged companies will get into trouble sooner or later.  This is definitely not BRK at book value or JPM at tangible book.  I tend not to think that rates are going higher as I am a little biased to the deflationary side (Japan-style). 

It's an interesting opportunity to get on board with some amazing people in the early stages of something, but there is risk here.

I was going to do some work on the valuation but I think so much of the value here is what Rutledge and Malone can do going forward (and the deals that will come down the pike).  Otherwise, the key factor in valuation is the net operating loss, which we know Malone and Co. will figure out how to use.  For other money losing operations it's hard to think NOL's will ever be realized, but when you get Malone involved, you know it will be realized sooner or later.

More Special Situations
Anyway, the stock market has come a long way since I have been sort of pounding the table on it since starting this blog in late 2011 (I loved financials, the stock market, and hated gold.  Not to brag or anything...  well, I hated Japan and Sony too, but I did expect a hard bounce on any weakening of the currency so it was not too surprising even though the speed and magnitude were.  I'm still on the fence about Japan; every few years there is this renewed enthusiasm that seems to fade.  I remember the Koizumi boom too...  Maybe I will make a post about Japan some other time).
 
And I will keep covering and talking about the financials since I do feel comfortable talking about them.  But since they may be getting into more 'normal' territory than 'cheap' (well, they are still cheap, but they've come a long way), I think I should start looking at other stuff.  I do look at other stuff, but posted mostly about financials.
 
I always wanted to talk more about special situations here, but frankly, since late 2011, the special-est situations to me were the financials.  They were great companies with great managements trading for really cheap for irrational reasons.  That is less and less the case these days so I want to look around at other stuff. 

Since markets are no longer so unloved as I thought it was in 2011, I will have to dig around a bit more to find stuff to write about (and invest in, even though I am still long a lot of financials).

So stay tuned!